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REDUCING THE HIGH COSTS
OF PATENT LITIGATION:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE
Duane Burton*
Patent infringement suits mail last for years and cost hundreds of thou-
sands of dollars. Several factors that contribute to the high cost of patent
litigation, however, can be eliminated or reduced. These cost reducing
alternatives can be and usually are overlooked by judges and practitioners.
Thus, Mr. Burton discusses some of the specific costs associated with
various phases of patent infringement litigation and suggests measures to
minimize those costs.
INTRODUCTION
The cost of infringement litigation can vary between $5,000 and $15,000
per month.' Included within this estimate are certain factors common to
patent infringement suits, such as prolonged discovery proceedings and ex-
tensive briefings of disputed motions or issues. These factors cause major
delays 2 and substantially add to the overall costs of patent litigation. Yet, the
* Duane Burton is senior partner in the firm of Burton & Dorr, Denver, Colorado. B.S.,
Colorado State University; J.D., University of Colorado. The author thanks James D. Foster,
J.D., for his research assistance on this article.
1. The following chart provides examples of litigation costs in five separate cases. The index
numbers to the table for each case are: 1) Barr Rubber Prods. Co. v. Sun Rubber Co., 277 F.
Supp. 484, 156 U.S.P.Q. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1967), 279 F. Supp. 49, 156 U.S.P.Q. 396 (S.D.N.Y.
1968) (awarding attorney's fees), modified, 425 F.2d 1114, 165 U.S.P.Q. 429 (2d Cir. 1970); 2)
Brian Jackson Assoc., Inc. v. San Manuel Copper Corp., 305 F. Supp. 66, 163 U.S.P.Q. 198 (D.
Ariz. 1969); 3) Saf-Gard Prods., Inc. v. Service Parts, Inc., 491 F. Supp. 996, 206 U.S.P.Q. 976
(D. Ariz. 1980); 4) Monolith Portland Midwest Co. v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chem. Corp., 267
F. Supp. 726, 152 U.S.P.Q. 380 (C.D. Cal. 1966), modified, 407 F.2d 288, 160 U.S.P.Q. 577
(9th Cir. 1969) (award of attorneys' fees reduced to $70,000); 5) Garbell, Inc. v. Boeing Co., 385
F. Supp. 1, 180 U.S.P.Q. 294 (C.D. Cal. 1973), aff'd, 546 F.2d 297, 192 U.S.P.Q. 481 (9th Cir.
1976).
Case Hours Fees Costs Cost/Fees Years
1) 3,000 $110,180 $ 7,231 6.6% -
2) 5,268 $191,236 $ 9,270 4.8% 9.5
3) 4,500 $184,650 $33,680 18.2% 10
4) 9,500 $280,000 - - 8
5) 18,525 $237,062 $81,943 21.9% 10
See Arnold, Innovation and the Patent System Role In It, A Patent Lawyer's Point of View, 8
A.P.L.A. Q.J. 131, 147 (1980).
2. Additional factors that may contribute to trial delays include a lack of urgency by the
parties and their attorneys, delay tactics by the attorneys, a hardline approach by a party with a
"deep pocket" who is hoping to wear down the other side, inexperienced counsel, an inattentive
court, and a full trial calendar. Pike, Cures Fail: Civil Cases Drag On, Nat'l L.J., Feb. 9, 1981,
at 1.
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costs of any patent infringement dispute are directly related to the manner in
which both parties litigate the case. If the risk of loss is great, it is only
natural that both parties will vigorously contest the issues.3 In some in-
stances, even though the cost is disproportionate to the risk involved, parties
are anxious to take the case through litigation. 4 In either situation, there is a
resulting increased cost and delay in resolving the dispute. This Article
presents some suggestions that courts and practitioners should seriously con-
sider at each step in a patent infringement suit to reduce litigation expenses.
I. AVOIDING LITIGATION
Infringement Evaluation
The easiest way to reduce litigation costs, of course, is to avoid litigation
altogether. For example, in two out of every fifteen cases, the plaintiff fails
to prove infringement. 5 The defendant avoids liability either by establishing
that the plaintiff's patent is invalid or that his product or process does not
infringe upon the claims made in the plaintiff's patent. Infringement exists
either literally or under the doctrine of equivalents. Literal infringement can
be easily established when the defendant has copied the product or process as
disclosed in the claims of the plaintiff's patent. It can be easily established
when the plaintiff's claims read exactly upon the defendant's product. On
the other hand, when infringement must be established under the doctrine of
equivalents," the plaintiff must determine the best way to prove infringe-
ment. Equivalency is established when a person reasonably skilled in the art
3. Harris & Chuppe, Cost of Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights: An Analysis, 14
IDEA 77, 85 (1970). The authors suggest that the financial stake of each party is the key to
determining how much time and money the respective parties will devote to the case. In other
words, the possible economic loss or gain resting on the outcome of a case determines the degree
of each party's financial involvement. Id.
4. Schramm, Cost of Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights: A Report of Interviews, 14
IDEA 93, 97 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Schramm]. The suggestion is made that as cases become
more expensive, the litigation costs seem to become disproportionate to the amount at stake. One
explanation for this occurrence is that at a particular point in a case, the focus changes from how
much the client has spent on the case to how much more expenditure is necessary to prevail or
maintain his position. Id. at 97-98.
5. One commentator has suggested a number of factors which may lead to a failure by
plaintiff to prove infringement. These factors include judicial application of a narrower range of
equivalents than that applied by plaintiff, strict judicial construction of the claims after deciding
that the patent is valid, and an overemphasis by the plaintiff's attorney on proving validity to the
neglect of the infringement aspects of the case. G. KOENIG, PATENT INVALIDITY: A STATISTICAL
AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS § 5.04, at 5-25 (1st rev. ed. 1980).
6. For a discussion of the doctrine of equivalents, see Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air
Prod. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608-09, 85 U.S.P.Q. 328, 330 (1950). The doctrine applies where an
invention "performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achieve the
same result." Id. (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42, 3 U.S.P.Q. 40,
44 (1929)). The devices will be considered the same even though they "differ in name, form or
shape." 339 U.S. at 608-09, 85 U.S.P.Q. at 330 (quoting Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120,
125 (1877)). Before a court will resort to this doctrine to enlarge the scope of a claim to find an
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would have known that the devices in question essentially accomplish the
same function in the same manner. 7 Because of the difficulties in demonstrat-
ing the interchangeability of the defendant's device as required under this
doctrine, the practitioner should thoroughly evaluate the strength of his
infringement allegations before commencing his suit.
Plaintiff's Willingness to License
As part of the initial infringement evaluation, counsel for the plaintiff
should discuss with his client the possibility of granting the defendant a
license for the product in question. From the plaintiff's point of view, the
desirability of granting a license in lieu of litigation depends upon the
strength of the validity of the patent and the economic success of the pat-
ented product. A strong patent, 8 a profitable product, or both, will cause the
plaintiff to be more reluctant in granting the defendant a license. Normally,
these factors will increase the defendant's receptivity to accepting a license in
lieu of risking the total loss of the product and perhaps his entire business to
an injunction.
In the event that the plaintiff is willing to license his patent, it is generally
recommended that, initially, he not take the hardline approach by demand-
ing that the alleged infringer cease and desist its activities. Rather, the
plaintiff can obtain more favorable terms by first offering the defendant
freedom from suit and a release from damages for past infringement. The
undesirable message that the infringer must discontinue the infringing activ-
ity should be conveyed only when the defendant appears to be strongly
opposed to the idea of accepting a license. When a license is clearly a
reasonable option for both parties, it is a successful means of reducing
litigation costs.
Settlement
Pre-trial settlement is one of the most effective means of avoiding the high
cost of litigation. Settlement also alleviates the adverse publicity which often
may accompany a trial. Furthermore, settlement may prevent the disclosure
of confidential business matters and avoid a potential increase in outside
competition to both parties, which might occur if the patent were to be
invalidated at trial. There are usually two factors, however, which inhibit
infringement, the literal wording of the claim will receive a liberal construction. P. ROSENBERG,
PATENT LAw FUNDAMENTALS 302 (1975).
7. See Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42, 3 U.S.P.Q. 40, 44 (1929);
Hunt v. Armour & Co., 185 F.2d 322, 327, 88 U.S.P.Q. 53, 58 (7th Cir. 1950); Lockheed
Aircraft Corp. v. United States, 190 U.S.P.Q. 134, 146 (Ct. Cl. 1976).
8. A strong patent is one in which the presumption of validity has been strengthened by the
fact that most of the prior art advanced by the defendant was considered in an interference
proceeding, reissue application, or by the Patent Office Board of Appeals. Prior decisions of
validity strengthen the presumption of validity in later litigation. G. KOENIG, PATENT INVALID-
ITY: A STATISTICAL AND SUBSTANTIVE ANALYSIS § 5.05[6] (lst rev. ed. 1980).
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the immediate settlement of the patent dispute. First, a case cannot be
settled until the attorney has discussed the ramifications of the settlement
proposal on his client's business with the client. Second, because the initia-
tion of an infringement suit is probably the result of a deteriorating relation-
ship between the parties, the lines of communication must be re-established
before a settlement can be attempted.
A creative settlement proposal, therefore, should begin with a list of
concessions that each party might be willing to make and a determination of
whether these proposals are feasible. In many instances, the concessions
originally proposed will not actually be agreed upon; rather, a compromise
developed during the course of negotiation will be accepted. Pre-trial settle-
ment compromises often include the cessation of the infringing activity, the
modification of the design of the product to eliminate infringement, and the
monetary compensation for past infringement. Tailoring the agreement to
the particular needs of the parties accelerates the settlement process. Of
course, the speed with which the settlement takes place determines the
amount of money saved.
Creative settlement proposals require proper timing. Although a party
may be able to formulate a creative settlement proposal shortly after com-
mencement of the litigation, he should refrain from presenting any proposal
until ascertaining that his adversary will be receptive to it. Moreover, a party
hoping to negotiate a settlement agreement should closely monitor the busi-
ness operations of the infringer. An infringer may be more likely to settle just
prior to the consummation of a transaction involving the infringing device, a
public stock offering, a merger, or an acquisition.
If the parties agree to a settlement, the patentee must consider the holdings
of Lear v. Adkinsg and its progeny,' 0 which allow a party to an out-of-court
9. 395 U.S. 653, 162 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1969). The Lear Court held that a licensee was not
estopped by its licensing agreement from subsequently challenging the validity of a patent. The
Court emphasized the important public interest "in permitting full and free competition in the
use of ideas which are ... part of the public domain." Id. at 670, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 8. The Lear
Court noted that this interest would be hampered if the estoppel doctrine was applied since
licensees may be the only individuals with enough economic incentive to challenge the patent-
ability of an inventor's discovery. Thus, the Court concluded that the technical requirements of
the contract doctrine must give away to the demands of public interest. Id. For a discussion of
the scope of the Lear doctrine, see Jennings & Bryan, The Ever Expensive Scope oJ Lear v.
Adkins: Does It Have Limits? 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 679 (1977).
10. Lower courts applied the Lear rationale to enable licensees to challenge patent validity
even after a settlement agreement was reached between the parties. See, e.g., Walter-Jenkinson
Co. v. Allied Chem. Corp., 567 F.2d 184, 193 U.S.P.Q. 753 (2d Cir. 1977) (licensee not
estopped from litigating validity of patent even though licensing agreement was result of
settlement in earlier litigation); Massillon-Cleveland-Akron Sign Co. v. Golden State Advertising
Corp., 444 F.2d 425, 170 U.S.P.Q. 440 (9th Cir.) (covenant in settlement agreement whereby
defendants agreed not to challenge validity of plaintiff's patent was in direct conflict with strong
federal policy referred to in Lear, and thus was void on its face and unenforceable), cert. denied,
404 U.S. 873, 171 U.S.P.Q. 322 (1971). But see Aro Corp. v. Allied Witan Co., 531 F.2d 1368,
190 U.S.P.Q. 751 (6th Cir.) (public interest in settlement of litigation outweighed any public
interest in allowing licensee a second chance to litigate patent validity), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
862, 191 U.S.P.Q. 392 (1976).
[Vol. 30:857
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settlement to contest the validity of the patent at a future time notwithstand-
ing the settlement agreement. To avoid future litigation on the same issues,
the terms of the settlement agreement should include disincentives to future
validity challenges by the alleged infringer."
Arbitration
A final alternative to resolving a patent infringement dispute before trial
proceedings is by arbitration. Arbitration of commercial conflicts is a well
developed alternative to litigation 12 and is favored by strong public policy, 13
however, it has limited application to patent disputes.14 Although there are
11. One commentator has suggested several precautions that can be incorporated into the
settlement agreement in an effort to diminish future validity challenges by the alleged infringer.
First, the owner should have all prior art relied on by the alleged infringer during negotiations
incorporated into the settlement agreement. This will prevent the alleged infringer from using
Lear to attempt to invalidate the property rights without any new prior art or additional
significant evidence that was available at the time of the settlement. Second, the settlement
agreement can include a promise by the alleged infringer to confess judgement in any court of
law for a large sum of money upon proof that he breached the settlement agreement. Finally, the
agreement can provide that any consideration received by the alleged infringer pursuant to the
terms of the agreement must be returned upon breach or contesting validity. P. SrERBER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY MANAGEMENT § 9.04, at 9-34 (1980).
12. See ARBITRATION: COMMERCIAL DISPUTES, INSURANCE, AND TORT CLAIMS (A. Widiss ed.
1979). Generally, courts agree that arbitration facilitates the settlement of disputes expeditiously,
with less complexity than litigation, and in essence, provides for a relatively inexpensive trial
before competent specialists. See Scherk v. Alberto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 510-11 (1974);
Diapulse Corp. of Am. v. Carba, Ltd., 626 F.2d 1108, 1110 (2d Cir. 1980); Conticommodity
Servs., Inc. v. Philipp & Lion, 613 F.2d 1222, 1224 (2d Cir. 1980); Seaboard Coast Line BR. v.
National Rail Passenger Corp., 554 F.2d 657, 660 (5th Cir. 1977); Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531
F.2d 585, 597-98 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Arkoosh v. Dean Witter & Co., 415 F. Supp. 535, 540 (D.
Neb. 1976).
13. Numerous cases have recognized the existence of a public policy which favors the
resolution of disputes by arbitration. See Fuller v. Guthrie, 565 F.2d 259, 261 (2d Cir. 1977);
Allegaert v. Perot, 548 F.2d 432, 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 432 U.S. 910 (1977); Hanes Corp.
v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 597 (D.C. Cir. 1976); J.S. & H. Const. Co. v. Richmond County
Hosp. Auth., 473 F.2d 212, 214-15 (5th Cir. 1973); United States ex rel. Duo Metal & Iron
Works, Inc. v. S.T.C. Const. Co., 472 F. Supp. 1023, 1024 (E.D. Pa, 1979).
14. See, e.g., Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 593, 189 U.S.P.Q. 331, 336 (D.C. Cir.
1976) (scope and validity of patents should be decided by federal courts rather than arbitrators);
Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. Technical Dev. Corp., 433 F.2d 55, 63, 167 U.S.P.Q. 10, 15 (7th
Cir. 1970) (patent validity and infringement questions are inappropriate for arbitration and
should be resolved by a court of law), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 976, 169 U.S.P.Q. 65 (1971);
Diematic Mfg. Corp. v. Packaging Indus., 381 F. Supp. 1057, 1061, 184 U.S.P.Q. 410, 413
(S.D.N.Y. 1974) (patent validity and infringement disputes are clothed with public interest and
should be resolved by courts rather than an arbitrator); Leesona Corp. v. Cotwool Mfg. Corp.,
Judson Mills Div., 204 F. Supp. 141, 143, 134 U.S.P.Q. 22, 25 (W.D.S.C. 1962) (patent validity
and patent infringement are issues unsuited for arbitration and should be determined by the
courts), afJ'd, 315 F.2d 538, 137 U.S.P.Q. 177 (4th Cir. 1963); Babcock & Wilcox Co. v. Public
Serv. Co., 193 U.S.P.Q. 161, 163 (S.D. Ind. 1976) (patent validity and infringement questions
are inappropriate for determination by an arbitrator and should be resolved in the courts). But
see Robin Prods. Co. v. Tomecek, 465 F.2d 1193, 1196, 175 U.S.P.Q. 135, 137 (6th Cir. 1972)
(court suggests that dismissal of infringement case would have been appropriate because of
defendant's "resort to arbitration in which all issues could be raised").
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both federal 15 and state statutes 1 governing contractual agreements between
parties to arbitrate disputes, many courts have held that questions of patent
infringement and validity cannot be arbitrated due to the great public
interest in challenging invalid patents' 7 and the belief that patent controver-
sies are not commercial disputes.' 8
Similar to patent disputes, antitrust disputes are an exception to the notion
that arbitration is a judicially favored procedure for settling commercial
disputes. Agreements to arbitrate antitrust claims are not generally permit-
15. See Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1976). The Act applies to matters
involving interstate or foreign commerce. It provides that: arbitration agreements are valid and
enforceable, Id. § 1; an issue in a proceeding is subjected to an arbitration clause, the proceeding
may be stayed until the issue is arbitrated, Id. § 3; arbitration can be compelled by the court, Id.
§ 4; the court may enter judgment on the arbitration award if the agreement so provides, Id. § 9;
the court may vacate the arbitration award under specific circumstances, Id. § 10; the court may
make a modification or correction of the award, Id. § 11.
16. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 10, § 101 (1975); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-1, 2 (West 1952);
N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW § 7501 (McKinney 1980). For a discussion of the characteristics of various
state arbitration statutes and a listing of the states adopting such statutes, see Janicke & Borovoy,
Resolving Patent Disputes By Arbitration: An Alternative to Litigation, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
337, 349-53 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Resolving Patent Disputes By Arbitration].
17. See, e.g., Lear v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 162 U.S.P.Q. 1 (1969). In Lear, the Court
recognized the public interest -'in permitting full and free competition in the use of ideas which
are in reality a part of the public domain." 395 U.S. at 670, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 8. The Court went
on to say that concern for the challenging of patent validity is further warranted in that the
issuance of a patent by the Patent Office often occurs in an ex parte proceeding in which no
arguments are proffered by parties interested in the determination of patent validity. Id.
Generally, courts disapprove of the settlement of patent disputes by arbitration because they
involve questions of public interest. See note 14 supra. See generally P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW
FUNDAMENTALS § 16.0314] (2d rev. ed. 1981). For an example of an arbitration agreement
resulting in the successful resolution of a patent dispute, see Resolving Patent Disputes By
Arbitration, supra note 16. In considering the suitability of resolving patent issues through
arbitration, one court noted that patent issues involve complex and difficult questions and the
application of an extremely technical body of law. Such questions are likely to be unfamiliar to
arbitrators who may not even be lawyers. In addition, the expertise of arbitrators generally is
better suited for resolving contract disputes rather than analyzing the impact of federal legisla-
tion on a particular agreement. See Hanes Corp. v. Millard, 531 F.2d 585, 593 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
18. Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides:
A written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transac-
tion involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any part
thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing controversy
arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be valid, irrevocable and
enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.
9 U.S.C. § 2 (1970).
In Zip Mfg. Co. v. Pep Mfg. Co., 44 F.2d 184, 7 U.S.P.Q. 62 (D. Del. 1930), the court stated
that the question of patent validity and infringement does not involve a dispute concerning
commerce or a maritime transaction. Id. at 186. As a result, the court concluded that an
agreement to arbitrate a patent validity or infringement controversy was not the type of dispute
the Federal Arbitration Act was intended to encompass. Id.
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ted'" because (1) such claims are not merely private matters, but are part of
the national interest in a competitive economy; (2) the evidence is too com-
plex for arbitration procedures; and (3) business arbitrators are not consid-
ered the appropriate guardians of antitrust policy. 2° This general rule, how-
ever, does not apply if there is an agreement to arbitrate an existing antitrust
dispute. 2' This type of an agreement differs from an agreement to arbitrate
future disputes because the parties have actual knowledge of the issues to be
arbitrated. Therefore, in an antitrust case involving an existing dispute
followed by an agreement to arbitrate, the use of arbitration was upheld
because "as a claimant is not required to sue and is always free to settle a
private treble damage antitrust case, his agreement to arbitrate is in effect an
agreement to settle the dispute." 2
19. See Applied Digital Technology, Inc. v. Continental Cas. Co., 576 F.2d 116, 117 (7th
Cir. 1978) (public interest, the complexity of issues and evidence, and the limited ability of
arbitrators to render antitrust claims inappropriate for arbitration); Sam Reisfeld & Son Import
Co. v. S. A. Eteco, 530 F.2d 679, 681 (5th Cir. 1976) (antitrust claims should go to trial as they
generally are inappropriate for arbitration); Janmort Leasing, Inc. v. Econo-Car Int'l, 475 F.
Supp. 1282, 1291 (E.D.N.Y. 1979) (antitrust disputes are inappropriate for arbitration and
should be resolved by courts); Hunt v. Mobil Oil Corp., 444 F. Supp. 68, 69 (S.D.N.Y. 1977)
(public interest in the discovery of antitrust violations makes antitrust claims inappropriate for
arbitration). In Hunt, the court declared that the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit "made
it unmistakably clear that it continued to apply the underlying rationale of its earlier cases that
arbitration agreements must be subordinated to adjudication by the courts of actions which seek
to uphold the public interest although advanced in private litigation." Id. at 71. But see United
States ex rel. Capolino Sons, Inc. v. Electronic Missile Facilities, Inc., 364 F.2d 705 (2d Cir.),
appeal dismissed, 385 U.S. 924 (1966) (dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60);
Evans v. Hudson Coal Co., 165 F.2d 970 (3d Cir. 1948).
20. See American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 826-27 (2d Cir.
1968). For a discussion of the policy questions involved in the determination of antitrust disputes
through arbitration, see Timberg, Antitrust Aspects of Patent Litigation Arbitration and Settle-
ment, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 244 (1977).
21. See Coenen v. R. W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1215 (2d Cir.) (agreement to
arbitrate antitrust dispute upheld because the agreement was made after the dispute arose), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 949 (1972); Power Replacements, Inc. v. Air Preheater Co., 426 F.2d 980, 984
(9th Cir. 1970) (agreement to arbitrate existing claims are valid in that parties know what claims
are being submitted for arbitration); American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391
F.2d 821, 827-28 (2d Cir. 1968)(agreements to arbitrate after a controversy has arisen are an
exception to the general rule that arbitration of antitrust disputes are inappropriate); Moran v.
Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, 389 F.2d 242, 246 (3d Cir. 1968) (voluntary agreements to
arbitrate an existing dispute are valid and are not subject to the same arguments which preclude
agreements to arbitrate future controversies). See also Pitofsky, Arbitration and Antitrust En-
forcement, 44 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1072, 1079 n.31 (1969) (author recognizes the presumption
against the arbitration of antitrust claims, but suggests that there is reason to carve out an
exception to this general rule).
If a court finds that the antitrust claims do not have a relatively good chance for success, the
arbitration agreement should not be thwarted. Compare N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele
Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532 F.2d 874, 876-77 (2d Cir. 1976) (court would not stay
arbitration because claimant had not clearly established antitrust charges) with Varo v. Compre-
hensive Designers, Inc., 504 F.2d 1103, 1104 (9th Cir. 1974) (court stayed arbitration because
probability of establishing antitrust violation was so strong).
22. Coenen v. R.W. Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209, 1215 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S.
949 (1972). In Coenen, the court also intimated that it would be a "pity" if a party could
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Analogously, an agreement to arbitrate a patent validity or infringement
suit is, in effect, an agreement to settle the dispute. Consequently, if parties
enter into an agreement to arbitrate an existing dispute concerning the scope
and validity of patents, there is no sound policy reason why the dispute
should not be submitted to an arbitrator rather than a judge, as in antitrust
cases. The same public interest of resolving disputes before a tribunal exists
for both antitrust and patent controversies;2 3 therefore, if courts permit
existing disputes in an antitrust case to be resolved by arbitration, logic
suggests that the same should hold true for existing disputes in a controversy
involving the validity or scope of a patent.2 4 Patent arbitration is not neces-
sarily more complex than antitrust arbitration.
Patent validity and infringement suits, however, may not always lend
themselves to arbitration. Arbitration should not be pursued unless the stakes
are low enough so that each side can afford to lose. Moreover, the patentee
should be willing to grant a license to the accused infringer, and there must
be a mutual trust in the experience and basic integrity of opposing counsel. 25
If the parties agree to arbitrate, they should also agree on the procedures to
be observed (including the selection, payment, and duties of the arbitrator),
the rules of discovery and evidence applicable to the arbitration, and the
means of enforcing the decision.
Notwithstanding the limitations on the use of arbitration in the determina-
tion of patent validity and infringement, parties to patent litigation can
beneficially use arbitration to resolve various issues of fact which may lead to
an early settlement of the case or, at a minimum, a reduction of the number
of issues to be litigated at trial.2 6 In addition, many aspects of patent licens-
ing are governed by the general law of contracts. 27 Therefore, an agreement
frustrate an arbitration agreement by simply including in the complaint a dispute that arose after
the parties had previously entered into an agreement to arbitrate existing claims. Id. at 1215-16.
It should be noted, however, that Coenen involved a dispute between New York Stock Exchange
members, and Congress had demonstrated an intent to promote self-regulation by the stock
exchange. See Hunt v. Mobile Oil Corp., 444 F. Supp. 68, 70-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
23. See notes 17 & 19 and accompanying text supra.
24. It should be noted that any agreement between parties to an interference which provides
for termination of the interference must be in writing and filed in the Patent and Trademark
Office. 35 U.S.C. § 135(c) (1976).
25. See Resolving Patent Disputes By Arbitration, supra note 16, at 358-59.
26. Although the "'ultimate question of patent validity is one of law,'" Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459, 467 (1966) (citing A & P Tea Co. v. Supermarket Corp.,
340 U.S. 147, 155, 87 U.S.P.Q. 303, 307 (1950)), no case law suggests that any limitations are
placed on the use of arbitration to resolve factual matters and to identify the relevant issues in a
patent validity case.
27. See, e.g., Peck v. Shell Oil Co., 142 F.2d 141, 144, 61 U.S.P.Q. 260, 262 (9th Cir. 1944)
(failure of consideration renders exclusive patent licensing agreement invalid); Mead Corp. v.
United States, 490 F. Supp. 405, 408, 208 U.S.P.Q. 205, 206 (D.D.C. 1980) (when parties enter
into licensing contract concerning their respective patent rights, the contract controls); Duplan
Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 670, 197 U.S.P.Q. 342, 362 (D.S.C. 1977)
(rules of construction for contracts are applicable to the construction of patent licenses); Bellows
v. E.R. Squibb & Sons, Inc., 359 F. Supp. 204, 205, 175 U.S.P.Q. 523, 525 (N.D. I11. 1973)
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by the parties to submit to arbitration disputes arising from the licensing
agreement can be analyzed in terms of contract law, which permits the
contracting parties freedom in defining the specific terms and conditions of
the contract. 28 As a result of this application of contract law to patent
licensing agreements, courts generally uphold agreements to arbitrate con-
troversies that arise in a patent licensing agreement.
29
II. PRE-TRIAL
Plaintiff's Action
A patent infringement action is initiated by filing a complaint with a
federal district court. 30 Although the use of a "notice" type pleading is
(where defendant granted exclusive license to make device patented by plaintiff, failure of
defendant to make a "reasonable effort" or use due diligence to exploit the device gave rise to a
breach of contract); Deering Milliken Research Corp. v. Textured Fibres, Inc., 310 F. Supp.
491, 498-99, 165 U.S.P.Q. 56, 61 (D.S.C. 1970) (implicit in licensing contract between plaintiff
and defendant is the contractual requirement of good faith).
28. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648, 670, 197 U.S.P.Q. 342,
363 (D.S.C. 1977) (parties' construction of contract is accorded great weight and each license
agreement must be viewed as a whole to determine the parties' true intention).
29. See, e.g., Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 440 F. Supp. 897, 901, 195
U.S.P.Q. 649, 651 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (questions of patent coverage which might arise in a licensing
agreement are frequently determined by arbitration); N.V. Maatschappij Voor Industriele
Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 532 F.2d 874, 876, 190 U.S.P.Q. 385, 387 (2d Cir. 1976) (claims
that patent licensee failed to perform its obligations stipulated in a patent licensing agreement
were proper for arbitration). See generally P. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 16 (2d
rev. ed. 1981) (parties are free to enter into an agreement regarding arbitration in a licensing
contract, providing the agreement does not violate antitrust or statutory prohibitions).
In addition, the Supreme Court has ruled that an agreement to arbitrate is treated as
independent from the contract in which it is contained so that a decision that may render a
contract null and void does not automatically result in invalidity of the arbitration clause
contained in the agreement. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-
04 (1967).
Because the rules applicable to the course and conduct of civil actions apply, for the most part,
to actions involving patent license contracts, A. W. DELLER, WALKER ON PATENTS § 420 (2d ed.
1965), the court always may refer questions arising in a patent licensing controversy to a master
for determination, recommendation, and report under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53. See
Cold Metal Process Co. v. United Eng'g & Foundry Co., 132 F. Supp. 597, 599, 105 U.S.P.Q.
333, 334 (W.D. Pa. 1955), af.f'd, 235 F.2d 224, 110 U.S.P.Q. 332 (3d Cir. 1956).
30. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide: "A civil action is commenced by filing a
complaint with the court." FED. R. Civ. P. 12. The federal district courts have original jurisdic-
tion over patent infringement actions. 28 U.S.C. § 1338 provides:
(a) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action arising under
any Act of Congress relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights and
trade-marks. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive of the courts of the states in patent,
plant variety protection and copyright cases.
(b) The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action asserting a
claim of unfair competition when joined with a substantial and related claim under
the copyright, patent, plant variety protection or trade-mark laws.
28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1976). Note, however, § 1498 of Title 28 provides that the Court of Claims has
original jurisdiction of patent infringement claims brought against the United States govern-
ment. Id. § 1498(a). With regard to venue, § 1400(b) of Title 28 provides: "Any civil action for
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sufficient, 3 a "storybook" complaint 32 is preferred because it enables both
parties to identify the disputed issues quickly and permits the defendant to
ascertain the plaintiff's position on the crucial issues of validity and infringe-
ment. Receipt of this information from the complaint will reduce the amount
of discovery otherwise required by the defendant. Furthermore, the defend-
ant will have to respond thoroughly to each allegation, and thus, the plain-
tiff will be more informed as to the defendant's stand on the issues. The use
of a storybook complaint also may give the plaintiff greater leverage when
seeking a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction because
the judge hearing the dispute may feel more comfortable when making those
rulings if he has as much information as possible before him.
Although this type of complaint may require a greater expenditure of time
and money at the outset of the litigation, it usually will help reduce the
overall cost of patent litigation. Because information in a storybook com-
plaint will eventually be required, regardless of whether the case is settled or
goes to trial, it should be set forth in the complaint at the outset.
In addition to filing a storybook complaint, it is generally recommended
that the plaintiff attach a copy of the patent to the complaint. This gives the
defendant immediate knowledge of the patent in controversy, and also af-
fords the judge an opportunity to review it. The plaintiff also should give the
patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district where the defendant resides, or
where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a regular and established place
of business." Id. § 1400(b).
31. Section 8(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
A pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counter-
claim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, shall contain (1) a short and plain statement
of the grounds upon which the court's jurisdiction depends, unless the court already
has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new grounds of jurisdiction to support it, (2)
a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to
relief ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a) (emphasis added). See Mann v. Adams Realty Co., 556 F.2d 288, 289 (5th
Cir. 1977) (short and plain statement of claim is sufficient if fair notice is given); Hoshman v.
Esso Standard Oil Co., 263 F.2d 499, 501 (5th Cir.) (federal rules require only a notice pleading
containing a short and plain statement of a claim), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 818 (1959); United
States v. Stull, 105 F. Supp. 568, 570 (D. Conn.) (complaint giving fair notice is sufficient),
aft'd, 200 F.2d 413 (2d Cir. 1952); Moore v. Erie County Agr. Soc'y, 12 F.R.D. 6, 7 (W.D.N.Y.
1951) (complaint is sufficient if it contains short and plain statement of claim and fairly gives
notice).
32. Reference to a "storybook" complaint is made to describe a pleading which provides the
facts and circumstances leading to the infringement suit in narrative form. Through this method
of pleading, the plaintiff is able to clearly describe the fact situation which entitles him to relief,
It should be noted, however, that this "storybook" complaint should not include nonessential
facts or extensive legal analysis supporting the claim. Such a complaint may violate the "short
and plain statement" requirement of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. FEo. R. Civ. P. 8(a).
See Harzfeld's, Inc. v. Otis Elevator Co., 114 F. Supp. 480, 485-86 (W.D. Mo. 1953) (lengthy
complaint sta-ting-many nonessential facts was defective as not complying with "short and plain"
requirement); Barnhart v. Western Md. Ry., 41 F. Supp. 898, 899 (D. Md. 1941) (recitation of
origin and history of plaintiff's grievances does not comply with "short and plain" complaint
rule), aJ'd, 128 F.2d 709 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 671 (1942).
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defendant a copy of the file history of the patent and the art cited. Furnish-
ing these materials to the defendant will not materially increase the overall
cost of litigation, and should actually aid in reducing the amount of time
necessary to prepare for trial. Moreover, it should demonstrate to the defend-
ant the basis of the plaintiff's position and foster an attitude of cooperation
between the parties that may actually reduce the cost of discovery, and
expedite the entire proceeding.
Defendant's Actions
The defendant also can play an important role in reducing the cost of
litigation before trial. Defense attorneys often feel that to protect their client
they must assert every available defense, regardless of whether the alleged
defenses are meritorious.3 3 This type of a "shotgun" defense, however, may
antagonize the opposing party, who may then prolong litigation by refusing
to settle even though it would appear to be the most logical and cost efficient
course to follow.
To more effectively advance the trial, the defendant should assert a gen-
eral defense that the patent does not meet the requirements of the patent
statutes. This will keep costs down and will not waive the defendant's right
to make an inquiry into areas which may reveal facts that would support a
more specific defense. 34
The defendant also may aid in minimizing the cost of a patent infringe-
ment suit by keeping disputed issues to a minimum. The defendant should
refrain from asserting any permissive counterclaims, particularly when the
plaintiff's financial resources are substantially greater than the defendant's.
This will make it more difficult for the plaintiff to pursue unlimited and
costly discovery.
Many defense attorneys, however, feel that they have an obligation to
counterclaim for an antitrust violation. 35 Although a valid counterclaim may
exist under the antitrust laws, proof of such claims requires resolution of
different issues and the proffer of different witnesses. This necessitates addi-
33. Viewed in this manner, this approach is not only time-consuming and expensive, but also
may be counterproductive. For example, by devoting equal attention to all defenses asserted, the
defendant may not dedicate enough time to the one or two critical defenses that, if proven, will
dispose of the case in his favor. Similarly, when the defendant pursues all possible defenses with
equal vigor, the judge or jury may assign the same amount of importance to each one. Thus, if
the trier of fact concludes that certain more readily understandable defenses are without merit,
he also may conclude that none of the remaining defenses is valid.
34. For example, the defendant might discover the existence of a sale or public use that
occurred more than one year before the patent application was filed, or discover that the
patentee filed a corresponding foreign patent application without obtaining the necessary export
license. See 35 U.S.C. § 184 (1976).
35. This counterclaim is based primarily on the premise that the patent is invalid and
plaintiff knew or should have known of its invalidity. Thus, plaintiff's initiation of a patent
infringement suit under these circumstances is asserted to be an unlawful extension of a patent
monopoly in violation of § 2 of the Sherman Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
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tional discovery that can materially add to the litigation costs of both parties.
If the defendant waits until after the patent infringement suit is resolved, he
will not waive his right to sue for an antitrust violation and he will be in a
better position to assess accurately the potential antitrust claim.
Further, the defendant should avoid asserting the affirmative defense of
fraudulent patent procurement.3" Most plaintiff's attorneys will go to great
lengths to defeat this defense because the plaintiff may feel that he must
vindicate himself once this charge has been made. The assertion of this
defense may therefore preclude a settlement and substantially increase the
cost of litigation.
Another step that the defendant may pursue to achieve a reduction in
litigation costs is to identify the prior art before trial. In so doing, both the
plaintiff and defendant will be evaluating the same prior art on the question
of obviousness. Although the parties may not actually agree what the prior
art demonstrates, some facts may be revealed that will focus the attention of
the parties upon the disputed issues. The plaintiff also may accelerate the
litigation process by including prior art on the issue of nonobviousness in the
complaint. To shorten the time for complying with discovery requests and to
prepare evidence for trial, the plaintiff should begin searching for evidence
of nonobviousness immediately after the complaint has been filed.
Discovery
Discovery in patent infringement controversies often comprises from
twenty-five to forty-three percent of the total litigation time. 37 For this
reason, a reduction in discovery will save a substantial amount of money.
There is frequently a lengthy time lag between the filing of the complaint
and trial because of protracted discovery proceedings. Although it is con-
tended that effective discovery can significantly reduce the time or complex-
36. Courts have approved the use of the fraudulent procurement defense to patent infringe-
ment suits. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 147
U.S.P.Q. 404 (1965) (fraud in procurement of patent is defense to infringement action); Preci-
sion Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Automotive Maintenance Mach. Co., 324 U.S. 806, 65 U.S.P.Q.
133 (1945) (person sued for patent infringement can challenge patent validity on fraudulent
procurement grounds); Carter-Wallace Inc. v. Riverton Laboratories, Inc., 304 F. Supp. 357,
164 US.P.Q. 697 (S.D.N.Y. 1969) (fraud in procurement of patent is a defense to infringement
action), affd, 433 F.2d 1034, 167 U.S.P.Q. 656 (2d Cir. 1970); Duplan Corp. v. Deering
Milliken, Inc., 353 F. Supp. 826, 176 U.S.P.Q. 432 (S.C.) (suit for patent infringement can be
successfully challenged by proof of fraudulent procurement), aff'd, 487 F.2d 459, 180 U.S.P.Q.
373 (4th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 978, 181 U.S.P.Q. 129 (1974); Monsanto Co. v. Rohm
& Haas Co., 312 F. Supp. 778, 164 U.S.P.Q. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1970)(fraudulent procurement is a
defense to patent infringement suit), aff'd, 456 F.2d 592, 172 U.S.P.Q. 323 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 934, 174 U.S.P.Q. 129 (1972).
37. Harris & Chuppe, Costs of Enforcement of Industrial Property Rights: An Analysis, 14
IDEA 77 (1970). The authors conducted a survey for the purpose of obtaining cost data of certain
work elements in patent infringement cases. Based upon the analysis of their responses, the time
allocated to each of the various phases of patent infringement litigation was as follows:
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ity of the remaining phases of litigation, it often has the opposite effect.3" In
fact, lengthy discovery procedures may discourage settlement 9 and induce a
longer trial.
Because of these problems, the parties should consider limiting the period
of discovery. 40 For example, they may agree to obtain a court order requiring
discovery to be completed within six to eight months following the filing of
the last responsive pleading. Then, only upon a proper showing could either
Simple Case Average Case Complex Case
Less than 2,000-4,000 More than
Work Element 2,000 hours hours 4,000 hours
Discovery 24.7 % 41.5 % 42.8 %
Prior art and infringe- 24.7 % 22.4 % 18.8 %
ment investigations,
legal studies and
evaluations
Cost of preparing briefs 33.7 % 27.4 % 30.0 %
and direct expenses of
time in trial court
Cost of appeals, inclu- 9.1 % 5.5 % 4.7 %
ding briefs and
argument
Other expenses 7.8 % 3.4 % 3.5 %
See also Harris, Chuppe & Tri, An Empirical Study of Cost Factors in Patent Litigation, 15 IDEA
523, 526 (1971).
38. See generally Schramm, supra note 4, at 108.
39. Discovery in patent cases often proves to be a source of bitterness, stubbornness, and
pettiness. This has led one district court to comment:
So often in patent cases parties want their opponents to admit everything, to
answer all interrogatories and to produce all documents, yet they themselves refuse
to admit very much, to answer any significant interrogatory, or to produce any
telling documents without argument before a court. There is rarely a spirit of co-
operation. Nothing is done voluntarily; everything requires an order of court. We
realize that important rights are involved in patent suits, rights which protect the
most important stimulant to our economy- inventiveness. To a certain extent,
however, every lawsuit involves important rights; yet no other segment of cases on
our docket produces such consistent examples of bitterness, stubbornness and petti-
ness. The adversary system need not produce such constant hostility.
Minnesota Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Norton Co., 36 F.R.D. 1, 3 (N.D. Ohio 1964). See also
Schramm, supra note 4, at 98 (where discovery costs are high, settlement is unlikely).
40. Harris, The Cost of Patent Litigation Study: Current Status and Future Direction, 14
IDEA 63, 67 (1970). In addition to limiting the period of discovery, many respondents to the
survey advocated additional judicial control of all pre-trial procedures. One attorney responding
to the survey suggested that the permission for all manner of discovery should come from the
same judge, and further, that he should deny it in the absence of good cause. Id.
In accordance with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26, the court should order that no
discovery be permitted on irrelevant matters and on stipulated or uncontroverted facts. For a
discussion of the impact of judicial controls on discovery, see P. CONNOLLY, E. HOLLEMAN & M.
KUHLMAN, JUDICIAL CONTROLS AND THE CIVIL LITIGATIVE PROCESS: DiscovEry 52 (1978).
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party obtain the court's permission to continue discovery following the ex-
piration of the court ordered discovery period.
Another problem with regard to discovery is that the attorneys often fail to
comply with the spirit of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 Discovery
frequently is used to cause delay or to harass the opposing party. 42 Responses
to interrogatories often are cursory and incomplete. This abuse of the discov-
ery process leads to a tiresome repetition of interrogatories, and motions to
compel information that should have been tendered upon the first request.
43
If the discovery delay tactics are minimized, the expense of discovery can be
greatly reduced. An effective method of discouraging such practices is to
assess attorneys' fees for motions to compel discovery when the court finds
that the discovery request was unwarranted or that the response did not meet
the standards contemplated by the discovery rules. The granting of attorneys'
fees under these circumstances could be accomplished by a prior agreement
between the parties or by court order.
In some instances, mere discussion of possible sanctions will streamline
discovery. In other cases, even the imposition of a penalty will not deter
undesirable discovery practices. Under section 285 of Title 35 of the United
States Code, however, an attorney who continues to abuse discovery subjects
his client to liability for attorneys' fees for the entire case. 44 Effective enforce-
41. A number of courts have acknowledged that Congress intended that the broad discovery
provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure be applied to patent interference actions. See
In re Natta, 388 F.2d 15, 156 U.S.P.Q. 289 (3d Cir. 1968); Natta v. Zletz, 379 F.2d 615, 153
U.S.P.Q. 768 (7th Cir. 1967); Vogel v. Jones, 350 F. Supp. 1297, 175 U.S.P.Q. 156 (D.N.J.),
ajf'd, 464 F.2d 573, 175 U.S.P.Q. 129 (3d Cir. 1972). In addition, Congress has specified that
the provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure relating to the attendance of witnesses and
the production of documents and things shall apply to contested cases in the Patent and
Trademark Office. 35 U.S.C. § 24 (1976).
42. The problem of harassment is most prevalent in answering interrogatories. Interrogato-
ries tend to be proliferated because very general interrogatories are first propounded and then
followed by questions which vary the circumstances. In one case, eight interrogatories were filed
calling for narrative answers which were proliferated into 875 interrogatories. See Schramm,
supra note 4, at 96. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(c) expressly provides for protective orders
to govern the operation of discovery, thus permitting the court to prevent abuse, either acciden-
tal or by design, that might otherwise flow from the ardent use of discovery.
43. See generally Schramm, wiupra note 4, at 108.
44. Section 285 provides that "[t]he court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attor-
ney fees to the prevailing party." 35 U.S.C. § 285 (1976). With regard to the award of attorney
fees for abuse of the discovery process, see General Instrument Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co., 399
F.2d 373, 158 U.S.P.Q. 498 (1st Cir. 1968) (attorney fees awarded because plaintiff failed to
disclose material information in response to defendant's interrogatories); Kaehni v. Diffraction
Co., 342 F. Supp. 523, 173 U.S.P.Q. 705 (D. Md. 1972) (attorney fees awarded because plaintiff
lacked candor in answering interrogatories and requests for admission), aff'd, 473 F.2d 908, 178
U.S.P.Q. 321 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973); L.F. Strassheim Co. v. Cold Medal
Folding Furniture Co., 294 F. Supp. 708, 161 U.S.P.Q. 692 (E.D. Wis. 1968) (attorney fees
granted for lack of diligence in responding to relevant pre-trial discovery requests), vacated and
remanded, 477 F.2d 818, 177 U.S.P.Q. 673 (7th Cir. 1973); Ashcroft v. Paper Mate Mfg. Co.,
159 U.S.P.Q. 410 (C.D. Cal. 1968) (attorney fees awarded because plaintiff concealed facts,
delayed taking of depositions and refused to obey order to produce documents), af'd, 434 F.2d
910, 168 U.S.P.Q. 66 (9th Cir. 1970).
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ment of this statute is likely to control discovery proceedings, thereby reduc-
ing discovery costs for both parties.
Finally, during the discovery process the parties should furnish the oppos-
ing counsel with the opinion of their experts. 41 Ideally, this information
should be exchanged within two months of the close of discovery. This
exchange will bring the precise position of the expert into focus, thus ena-
bling both parties to better assess their chances of prevailing on the merits.
Furthermore, the exchange of such information may facilitate settlement or
reduce the number of issues to be tried.
Pre-trial Conference
Another effective method of reducing costs before trial is the pre-trial
conference. Within two to four weeks after the defendant has obtained
copies of the identified prior art, but not more than six to eight weeks after
the complaint has been served, the attorneys should arrange a conference to
discuss the facts and issues in the case. At this conference each attorney
should identify those critical issues he believes will control the outcome of the
case. Although the issues may not actually be resolved, such a conference is
useful in clarifying those issues and identifying the positions of each party
with respect to the infringement claim. When this procedure is followed,
experienced attorneys are often able to substantially reduce the time and
money involved in bringing the suit to trial and, in many instances, reach an
early settlement.
Pre-trial Agreements
If attempts to avoid litigation fail, the parties may take a number of steps
before trial to reduce actual trial costs. The most significant factor contribut-
ing to the high cost of patent infringement litigation is the slowness of the
litigation process itself. Consequently, the attorneys and their clients should
consider every factor which might enable the parties to resolve certain
factual issues prior to trial. These factual disputes may be resolved in a
motion for summary judgment or by submitting them to a neutral third
party. 46 If these factual disputes can be resolved before trial, a substantial
savings in patent infringement costs can be realized.
45. The conditions under which there can be discovery of facts known and opinions held by
experts are set forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4). See Cold Metal Process Co. v.
Aluminum Co. of Am., 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 1947) (defendant in a patent case was entitled
to information from plaintiff's expert concerning tests and photographs of metal samples). See
generally 4 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACriCE 26.66 (2d ed. 1976).
46. As in arbitration, the parties attempt to procure a settlement through a neutral third
party that is satisfactory to both sides. Such a proceeding was used successfully in a complicated
patent infringement suit between Shell Oil Company and Intel Corporation involving semicon-
ductor memory patents owned by Shell. For a discussion concerning this proceeding, see Janicke
& Borovoy, Resolving Patent Disputes By Arbitration: An Alternative To Litigation, 62 J. PAT.
OFF. Soc'y 337 (1980).
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Another effective means of expediting the trial process, and therefore
decreasing the costs of litigation, is for both parties to reach an agreement
concerning the exchange of a pre-trial statement. Regardless of whether the
court asks for a pre-trial statement or order, such an agreement should be
exchanged at least thirty days after the close of discovery. Notwithstanding a
failure to agree upon all issues in the pre-trial statement, the parties may still
sign the pre-trial order and submit it to the court for review.
In addition to agreeing upon a pre-trial order, the parties can obtain
permission to postpone briefing on certain motions until the court has infor-
mally heard arguments on those motions. Courts may limit the filing of
briefs on motions to compel discovery or motions for protective orders. In
jurisdictions without rules on this subject, both parties should refrain from
filing additional reply briefs on the same motion. Early institution of this
procedure will insure that supplemental and responsive briefs will not be
submitted continually during the litigation process.
III. TRIAL
As previously noted, resolution of a patent case prior to trial is the easiest
and most efficient manner in which the high cost of patent litigation may be
reduced. Parties to a patent suit, however, often are not convinced that pre-
trial settlement is in their best interest. If attempts at pre-trial settlement fail,
several procedures may be attempted during the trial stage to limit expenses.
Meaningful settlement discussions are often hampered by the litigants'
uncertainty about how a jury might view a claim. Such uncertainty can be
reduced by using a summary jury trial that involves a half-day presentation
of evidence to a six person jury drawn from the regular juror pool. 47 This
nonbinding verdict may provide both parties with an estimate of how a jury
may view the merits of each case. A summary jury trial may facilitate an
early settlement of the case, thereby eliminating the expenses of a full trial.
Although Rule 42 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits claims or
issues to be separated at the discretion of the court,4 8 the trial judge should
47. The summary jury trial was instituted on an experimental basis by Judge Lambros, a
federal judge for the Northern District of Ohio. The basis for the idea was the uncertainty on the
part of litigants and lawyers concerning how a jury might view a claim. Judge Lambros notes
that after each side observes its case challenged as part of the appraisal mechanism, more
realistic negotiation occurs. Used particularly as a last resort before trial, Judge Lambros reports
a 90% settlement rate. See Oie Judges Invention: Summary Jury Trials, 67 A.B.A. J. 24 (1981).
48. Federal Rule 42(b) provides:
The court, in furtherance of convenience or to avoid prejudice, or when separate
trials will be conducive to expedition and economy, may order a separate trial of any
claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or third-party claim, or of any separate issue or of
any number of claims, cross-claims, counterclaims, third-party claims, or issues,
always preserving inviolate the right of trial by jury as declared by the Seventh
Amendment to the Constitution or as given by a statute of the United States.
FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b). This rule should not be confused with Rule 21, which provides for
severance of claims. FED. B. Civ. P. 21. Severance under Rule 21 usually leads to two or more
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guard against allowing the case to be tried in a piecemeal fashion. The
separation of issues only reduces the cost of patent infringement litigation
when the trial of one issue obviates the need for a trial of other issues. 49 In
these instances, the trial of one issue may encourage a settlement of the case
before a trial of the second proceeds.
CONCLUSION
There are a number of ways in which parties can reduce the cost of patent
infringement litigation. Parties may agree to settle the dispute through arbi-
tration, which is perhaps the most promising way to minimize costs. A
decision to submit factual disputes to a neutral third party is another viable
alternative. Although technically nonbinding, this course of action enables
each party to evaluate more accurately the merits of his case and facilitates
an early settlement of the dispute.
If the parties refuse to follow either of the above courses of action, several
steps may be taken during the pre-trial phase of litigation in an attempt to
reduce the total expense of a patent suit. Some of these steps are designed to
encourage a pre-trial settlement while others are suggested as a means of
expediting the entire trial process. Since discovery comprises the major por-
tion of the total expense incurred in a patent suit, parties are advised to
utilize every opportunity to cooperate during discovery to decrease the
amount of time required to complete this phase of litigation. In this regard,
the voluntary exchange of essential information is an indispensable factor.
In addition to reducing discovery costs, parties are encouraged to consider
creative settlement proposals. An early settlement is, without question, the
most effective manner in which to limit the cost of patent infringement
litigation.
When attempts of pre-trial settlement fail, however, several procedures
can be pursued during the trial stage which may curtail the expense of a
patent suit. These procedures include: thoroughly evaluating the alleged
infringement; moving for summary judgment in relatively simple cases;
limiting or postponing briefs until the court has informally heard the parties'
respective arguments; separating issues; streamlining defenses; and refrain-
ing from asserting permissive counterclaims or affirmative defenses. While it
may not be feasible to follow all of these suggestions in a given case, adher-
ence to any of the suggested procedures will aid in the reduction of the
expense of a patent suit.
separate civil actions and separate judgments while trials under Rule 42(b) usually lead to a
single judgment. See 9 C. WRcIHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRAcTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2387 (1971).
49. See, e.g., Molinaro v. Watkins-Johnson Cei Div., 60 F.R.D. 410, 413 (1973) (one
situation especially conducive to economy of time and convenience is where a single issue may be
dispositive of the case and its resolution might make a trial on the other issues unnecessary);
Laitram Corp. v. Deepsouth Packing Co., 279 F. Stipp. 883, 892 (E.D. La. 1968) (if a separate
trial of part of the issues may vitiate the trial of other issues, it is reasonable to hold such a trial in
order to save court time and reduce trial expenses).
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